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Dias 2 
AIMS AND VALUES IN MERGER CONTROL 
Not easy to identify a pattern across: 
• >20 years of practice 
• >6700 cases decided under the Merger Regulations 
• 2½ different Merger Regulations + Article 101/Article 
101 (3) 
 
Nevertheless, make an attempt focusing on: 
• efficiencies as the objective 
• potential hidden regulatory objective and (ab)use of 
remedies in the pursue thereof 
• the issue of Industrial Policy 
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Nothing conclusive in the texts 
Viewed from a formalistic perspective, it is 
unclear what governs EU merger control: 
 
• Neither the wording of EMR/Article 101 (3) nor their 
legal history offers anything conclusive 
• The initial (1973) proposal for EMR referred  to “.. objective… 
given priority…. in the common interest of the Community” as 
a dispersal reason. This was developed into a “balancing 
test” in later drafts (1988 and 1989)  
• The adopted Regulations (4064/89 and 139/04) do not 
incorporate any dispersal rule, but refers to issues such as 
effective competition, interest of consumers, technical 
and economic progress and 139/2004 efficiencies. Further, 
references are made to the objectives of Article 2 EC (130a 
EC) and Article 2 EU 
• Article 101 (3) incorporates a from of balancing test, but 
does not allow a market foreclosure 
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Nothing conclusive in the texts 
Viewed from a formalistic perspective, it is 
unclear what governs EU merger control: 
 
• Neither the wording of EMR/Article 101 (3) nor their 
legal history offers anything conclusive 
• However, it would be plausible to presume that the 
Commission originally favored a form of a 
balancing test “inspired” by Article 101 (3) 
• A balancing test under which the Commission could 
disregard impediment to competition for 
objectives given priority 
• The adopted Regulation did not incorporate a 
balancing test, but utilized the “dominance test” 
“inspired” by Article 102 
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Case law demonstrates ambiguity 
Viewed from a formalistic perspective, it is 
unclear what governs EU merger control: 
• Case law demonstrates ambiguity 
• In Aerospatiale-Alenia/de Havilland (1991), the identified 
efficiencies were initially held against the merged entity as 
likely to strengthen the dominance. Later when engaged in a form 
of balancing test, they were labelled insufficient and perhaps 
not even relevant to the assessment 
• Boeing/McDonnell Douglas (1997) is cited as an example where 
domestic undertakings (Airbus) came before consumers 
• In Ford/Volkswagen (1992), social considerations and rural 
area benefits were accepted under Article 101 (3) as dispersal 
reason as they were within the objective of the Treaty. The 
Commission has signalled (1990) that the same thing would 
apply under EMR 
• In the “Nestlé/Perrier law suit” (1995), the Commission (in my 
opinion) claimed to be confined to the straightjacket of the 
“dominance test” and thus unable to embrace other 
considerations except from on a general level 
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An economic welfare agenda? 
It is submitted that the governing agenda is 
of an economic welfare nature 
 
1. The experts (the academics) state this and so does 
the Commission: 
• “…. Consumer welfare is now well established as the 
standard the Commission applies when assessing 
mergers and infringements of the Treaty rules on 
cartels and monopolies. Our aim is simple: to 
protect competition in the market as a means of 
enhancing consumer welfare and ensuring an 
efficient allocation of resources……”  
 Speech by Commissioner Neelie Kroes - 
SPEECH/05/512 – Delivering Better Markets and 
Better Choices 
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An economic welfare agenda? 
It is submitted that the governing agenda is 
of an economic welfare nature 
 
2. The issued guidelines support this as 
demonstrated by the embracing of economic 
(welfare) arguments and considerations in the 
issued guidelines on horizontal and non-horizontal 
mergers and Article 101/Article 101 (3) 
3. The strict stand against pressure for accepting 
impediments to competition on the ground of 
Industrial Policy or crisis considerations renders 
it plausible. So does the rigid enforcement of 
Article 21 (sole jurisdiction) against Member States’ 
attempt to favour “national solutions” 
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A submission subject to some difficulties 
 
1. The statements should not shadow for neither the 
demonstrated ambiguity in case law nor the novelty of 
the guidelines. “Older” books tend to be more open to 
the issue 
2. The use of market shares as a proxy for the impact on 
competition indicates a negative stand on monopolies 
regardless of any efficiencies 
3. The welfare agenda in its purest form “the efficiency 
defence” is nothing more than a defence 
4. The General Court (Nestlé/Perrier) has authorised other 
considerations than the narrow competition perspective. 
The Commission has, however, been most unwilling to 
acknowledge anything beyond the efficiency defence and 
has been unwilling  to acknowledge this until recently 
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However, there might be more to it 
Dias 9 
Rather than rebutting the welfare agenda, I find it more 
accurate to submit that the emerging pattern would be 
one where the market structure is held at a premium. In 
particular as this would make a link between the structure 
of the Merger Regulation, it is “dominance test” and 
the actual enforcement 
 
Other issues, including efficiencies, are only accepted as a 
supplement or perhaps more fitting as a defence to be 
conducted subsequently 
 
In this light, it appears as if a variation of the original 
“balancing test” has been introduced through the back 
door, allowing the Commission to consider objectives 
given priority as a dispersal reason 
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The market structure is held at a premium 
Dias 10 
Rather than rebutting the welfare agenda, I find it more 
accurate to submit that the emerging pattern would be 
one where the market structure is held at a premium. 
In particular as this would make a link between the 
structure of the Merger Regulation, it is “dominance 
test” and the actual enforcement 
 
This raises two questions: 
1. Which objectives holds priority and could 
therefore be taken into consideration as a defence? 
2. What is to be considered an impediment in the 
first place, and what are the associated policy 
consequences? 
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The market structure is held at a premium 
Dias 11 
Which objectives holds priority? 
In Nestlé/Perrier, the General Court refers to “social 
considerations”, cf. Article 130a EC. Further, EMR 
refers to Article 2 EC and Article 2 EU 
• Article 2 EC, Article 2 EU and Article 130a EC have 
been updated and expanded, but generally refer to: 
• establishment of a common market  
• balanced and sustainable development of 
economic activities 
• a high level of employment and of social 
protection 
• a high level of protection of the environment  
• economic and social cohesion 
• Hence, relevant arguments incorporating these issues 
could (presumably) serve as a defense  
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What is to be considered an impediment? 
Holding the market structure at a premium has 
policy implications: 
 
1. A negative stand on concentrations creating 
horizontal or vertical foreclosure regardless of any 
implied efficiencies 
2. A strong preference for structural remedies 
reducing the level of concentrations even when 
behavioural remedies would be available 
3. An ability not only to identify new or further 
impediments as problematic, but also pre-existing 
impediments, e.g. monopoly rights or existing 
dominant positions 
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What is to be considered an impediment? 
 Unproblematic to oppose to concentrations creating 
an impediment to the Common Market, e.g. by 
establishing a dominant position 
 
 Less clear if it should be equally unproblematic to 
oppose to concentrations involving existing 
impediment to the Common Market, e.g. pre-
existing monopolies as it would amount to a 
prohibition on dominance  
 
 Regardless, the Commission has defined pre-existing 
impediments as “problematic” and (most actively) 
remedied these by commitments 
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Remedying pre-existing impediments? 
Many examples of cases where pre-existing impediments 
are labelled as “problematic” 
• Atlas/Phoenix (1996) - legal monopolies over the telecom 
infrastructure in Germany/France was held as problematic 
and requested remedied 
• Telia/Telenor (1999) - local loop unbundling was 
identified as an requirement for clearance 
• VEBA/VIAG (2000) - insufficient national price 
regulation of access to the grid in Germany was held 
problematic and remedied used to address this 
• Gas de France/Suez (2006) - unbundling of the gas 
transmission network was adopted as a remedy 
• EDF/EnBW (2001) - extremely high market shares in a 
geographical separated marked (France) was held 
against the acquisitions of German power plants, and 
divestures in France were therefore required 
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Remedying pre-existing impediments? 
When identifying pre-existing impediments as 
“problematic”, the Commission often: 
• Claims that lacunas and regulatory deficits in 
national regulation warrant intervention under 
competition law  
• However, in reality, lacunas and deficits might be 
in the adopted EU regulation drafting competition 
law into a regulatory role. The lacunas should 
either be remedied directly or as leverage in the 
political process when seeking to expand the Single 
Market regulation 
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Remedies and the Single Market 
It is even possible to see a link between merger 
remedies and the Single Market 
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Case Single Market issues 
Atlas/Phoenix (1996) monopoly 
rights in Germany/France was 
considered problematic 
Parallel to the case, the Commission tabled before the 
Council a proposal to liberalize the telecom 
infrastructure in general   
Telia/Telenor (1999) was cleared 
against i.a. local loop unbundling 
Shortly after the case, the Commission suggested that 
Local Loop unbundling by Regulation should be 
imposed in general 
VEBA/VIAG (2000) insufficient 
national price regulation of access 
to the grid was considered 
problematic 
The absence of national regulation was a consequence 
of the adopted EC Directive (1996) referring the issue 
to commercial negotiations. An option incorporated as 
part of the political process in the Council and thus 
accepted by the Commission 
Gas de France/Suez (2006) 
unbundling of the gas 
transmission network was adopted 
as a remedy 
The case identified shortfalls in the applicable energy 
regulation and was accompanied by the 
announcements of forthcoming Single Market 
initiatives  
EDF/EnBW (2001) extremely high 
market shares in France was 
considered an obstacle to 
acquisitions in Germany 
Did the Commission get tired of France and its 
persistently delayed implementation of adopted Single 
Market Regulation and decided to use the Merger 
Regulation to defrost the French energy market? 
Dias 17 
Remedies and the Single Market 
The use of merger remedies to pursue Single Market 
objective follows indirectly from the dominance test and 
its link to the market structure. Therefore, it is not per 
se problematic 
There is, however, other (more dubious) explanations: 
• Undertakings are easy prey when involved in a 
concentration as the time factor plays to the benefit of the 
Commission 
• Increased use of “fix it first remedies” and remedies in 
phase I reduces the quality of the analysis, making 
sectors with a high concentration and little competition 
prone to intervention and remedies 
• Mergers are rarely challenged before the General Court, and 
the latter has allotted the Commission a (wide) margin of 
discretion even if it involves a quasi- regulatory agenda 
(cf. EDP vs. Commission) 
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Single Market smells like Industrial Policy 
If accepted that the Commission occasionally pursues a 
regulatory agenda under the merger regulations, the 
issue of Industrial Policy might require some 
reconsideration 
 
No single definition of Industrial Policy available. 
Presuming that Industrial Policy covers not merely the 
forming of “national champions” through protectionism or 
inducing innovation and development by public 
investments in R&D, but any fundamental restructuring 
of sectors and industries 
 
Then, it could be submitted that Industrial Policy has 
been pursued in merger control in the form of the Single 
Market 
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Therefore, I submit the following: 
 
1. The protection of the market structure has been 
the main concern under merger control and the 
issue of efficiencies only a supplement 
2. The Commission has, through the back door, 
introduced a light version of the “balancing test  
suggested in 1973 and utilized in Article 101 (3) 
providing for a number of defences 
3. The Commission has occasionally used (perhaps 
even abused) merger control to pursue a 
regulatory agenda 
4. The Single Market could perhaps be labelled as the 
Commission’s concept of Industrial Policy 
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Concluding on 20+ years of experience 
